Psychology for the Other
a seminar on Emmanuel Levinas


  Back to
Seminar
 

Archive 2003

 

2003 Papers 2003 Presenters

 

2003 Papers

Abstracts

Download a copy of all the abstracts (Microsoft Word Document).

Papers

Back to top


2003 Presenters

Presenters and brief summaries

(click on presenter's name for biography. Microsoft Word document.)


Bettina Bergo.

Duquesne University
What is Levinas Doing? Ethical ‘Subjectivity’ between Phenomenology and Psycho-analysis

Is Levinas rewriting psychoanalysis, where the ego never achieves even the relative solidity promised it in Freudian and neo-Freudian therapies? The experience of substitution cannot be described conceptually, so Levinas uses hyperbole to overstate an experience affectively excessive to any linguistic form. Substitution is a sort of psychosis. Levinas gives us a genesis of desire that is an alternative to the desire of psychoanalysis. Bergo uses Julia Kristeva’s “aporia of sensation” to understand why Levinas exaggerates almost to the point of absurdity. Aporia: sensation must enter into language to become meaningful, but in translation sensation as non-discursive meaning is betrayed. Levinas overwrites Freudian psychology by rethinking the psyche as agonistically intersubjective. The ego is sensuous vulnerability, like a permanent narcissistic wound. He constructs an aesthetic style that enacts Saying, or the giving of responsibility. He sets the framework of the performance of therapy as an acute expression of ‘prophetism.’

James Faulconer.
BrighamYoung University.
What Kind of Knowledge is Knowledge of the Other?

Two kinds of knowledge of the Other: 1) object of knowledge with its properties, and, 2) an event of the immediate interruption of the Other of self. This allows for two kinds of psychology: 1) objective psychology, and, 2) hermeneutic psychology of the encounter with persons as “saturated phenomena.” The second psychology (hermeneutics) is fundamental to the first psychology (objective descriptions).

Ed Gantt and Stan Knapp.
Brigham Young University
The Ethics of Marriage: Contract, Commitment, and Covenant

First part challenges modernist notions of individuals in marriage to maximize personal benefit, and Aristotelian “virtue ethics” and some hermeneutics. Second part offers Levinasian concepts for marriage as being-for-the-Other in service and responsibility. Authors replace the metaphor of the market with the metaphor of covenant.

Joe Guppy, M.A. Seattle University, practicing therapist
A Levinasian Perspective on Psychopatholody/Addiction and its implications for Psychotherapy/12 Step Recovery, through the works of Emmanuel Levinas, J.H. van den Berg, and Bill W.

The pathological and addicts totalize others as they become more tolerant of their pathologies and drugs, and both progress in dependency on their pathologies. Therapy happens as both reach out in service to others as they recognize a “power greater than themselves,” Bill W. and the “infinity of the Other,” Levinas.

Dillon Inouye.
Brigham Young University
Primordial Responsibility and Psychology

Asks four questions: 1) What is the relationship between psychology and responsibility? (Ans.: Psychology has neglected primordial responsibility.) 2) What are the consequences of this neglect for psychology? (Ans.: Psychology’s generalizing theories cannot predict and control, and its interpretive theories cannot understand humans.) 3) What are the consequences for society? (Ans.: This neglect has aided the forces of catabolism and breakdown in responsibility in society.) 4) What should be done to correct the relationship and develop a more adequate psychology of responsibility? (Ans.: develop a new science of the soul that looks at least four exemplary portrayals of responsibility: a) rites of passage of cosmogonic creation myths; b) religious laws and ordinances; c) hagiography of saints; and, d) confessional testimonies of pilgrims.


Michel Juffe.
University of Paris-Marne-la-Vallee
Levinas and Passivity

Contrary to Western tradition where passivity is weakness, Levinas places it at the beginning of humans and not as a result of weakness. Juffe points to three ways of passivity, 1) meeting suffering and death; 2) meeting the feminine (or masculine) as the other gender; 3) meeting ones own children. Psychology must face three problems from these, 1) continuity between living and the dead, 2) differentiating of sexes and other dualisms, 3) novelty from one generation to another. Juffe points out three corresponding pathologies: 1) dereliction (neglected state, feeling of pettiness, obsessions, loss, etc.), 2) conflict (incest, domination, possessiveness); and, 3) sterility (instrumentation of the other, idolatry, depression).

Sheridan Phillips.
Santa Fe, New Mexico
Time and the Therapeutic Hour

Being itself is articulation of Time. Responsibility of Being is the behind-the-behind, the just-awakened moment, that psychology has not yet grasped in its thematizationof individual human solutions to media-ated cultural adaptation. Phillips challenges depth psychology, and offers Jean Gebser's cultural phenomenology: without acknowledging the invisible presence/movement of Time-ings in the consulting room, psychology, perhaps, serves only the escalation and completion of Time. Levinas's hypostasis as a rip in the present suggests the time of psyche-logos, the logic of soul movement that is Time's own and the very relationship between existing and the existent. The event of time grips me as everpresent as the grounding of Time and the event of being, but it does not have to be a blind event. The invisible Time-ing of the other calls forth the expression of time, the eventing of being of our face-to-face encounter and the origination of one's humanity.

Peter Rosan.
Bronx Children’s Psychiatric Center
The Varieties of Ethical Experience: Empathy, Sympathy and Compassion

A phenomenology of the conditions and forms of ethical experience: welcoming a world of living with and for the other (cf., Ricoeur, 1990/1992). Both philosophical reflection inspired by Levinas, Ricoeur, Scheler, Schopenhaur, and others, and by empirical research to 1) discover the moral sensibility of care believed to be already contextualized in a field of personal relationships, and, 2) describe the ethical aims or virtues embodied in a life of passion. The sensibility of care establishes a context where a person is opened to ways of valuing the other. Three distinct relational styles, 1) empathically joining-with and illuminating the meaning of the other’s expressions, including vicissitudes of the person’s own experience, 2) sympathetically feeling-for the other and either commiserating over his/her woe or rejoicing over his/her weal, and, 3) compassionately honoring the other’s dignity even when his/her suffering threatens to diminish him/her. The dialectic of giving and receiving, from this empirical research, does not support a naïve sentimentalism that disregards “traditional person” accounts of the role of responsibility and reason, but as a proposal designed to redress one-sided individualistic and intellectualistic approaches to the formation of an ethical life.

Steve Sandbank.
Maryland.
Heidegger and Levinas: Does the Bridge Swing or the World Call the Bridge?

Heidegger’s notion of human existence as the swinging bridge between himself and the world prioritizes subjectivity as disclosing the world, even a subjectivity whose consciousness is defined as openness. Levinas’s notion of humans as always called by the other to be responsible for the Other, prioritizes the Other, even though that Other is always a mystery and can never be known by subjectivity. Heidegger’s subjectivity can never be fully escaped. Levinas’s subjectivity as “subjected to...” opens to the other. Strauss and Boss, after Heidegger, leaves therapy susceptible to generalizing. Therapists after Levinas work toward absolute ethical responsibility for the other and freedom as related to assuming responsibility.


Robert Walsh.
Montana State
Beyond Therapy: Living Otherwise-than-being with Levinas

It is not technique that heals, but the interaction with a therapist who is not identified as a “therapist.” The “therapist” reduces the client to a pathological category, objectifies, destroys the otherness of the other. Claiming to know, to be in charge with an official office, diploma, fee, to understand the other, all this is called into question by the face facing, before this facing is conceptualized into a face-to-face encounter. The therapist disappears; “therapy,” “counseling,” even the “client” disappears. Not only the therapist and the client, the whole psychotherapeutic project is put into question by the unknowing from facing the other. Both are groping in the dark for some illumination to show the next thing to be done. It is better than groping alone. Healing happens on its own, when it will and where it will; in secret, naturally occurring before “I” arrive on the scene to accomplish it. Only when therapy disappears can therapy begin.

Richard Williams. Brigham Young University
Self-Betraying Emotion and the Psychology of Heteronomy

While Levinas has been judged as too austere and too counterintuitive, Williams links his philosophy of radical heteronomy to Warner’s study of self-betraying emotions, which grew out of studies of self-deception and theories on agentive action. In Self-betrayal studies, he developed the term, “mispresence.” He calls for an “ethical metaphysics” to understand the ontology of human persons.

Back to top

 

Department of Psychology • For more information contact Dr. George Kunz gkunz@seattleu.edu • 2004