

## *What in the Life World is Levinas Talking About?*

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### Introduction

As far as I know, no one has claimed that interpreting Emmanuel Levinas is straightforward. Even so, the task of understanding him is clearly challenging for those of us who are not philosophers and who are therefore not typically conversant with philosophical language and history. Nor are we necessarily interested in or attuned to the multiple and often implicit conversations that philosophers have with colleagues in their texts. Yet Levinas speaks to us. He speaks to us as persons as well as psychologists and psychotherapists because we live and practice in the realm of the interpersonal and because ethics are part of life. At least some of what presents, however peculiar and enigmatic his language may seem to be, resonates with what we have already been touched by or glimpsed.

My first exposure to his work was through a graduate philosophy course on *Totality and Infinity* (Levinas, 1961/1969) offered by Professor Charles Keyes at Duquesne University in 1970. Above all, it was then clear to me that Levinas addressed, in a profound and original way, dimensions of interpersonal relations neglected by psychology as well as philosophy. Further, I thought that his text had important implications for psychotherapy (Halling, 1975). More generally, Levinas offers us a vision that is ambiguously situated as it hovers between what we long for and what we want to turn away from, between what is given in daily existence and what we might embrace as an ideal.

How, then, should we approach Levinas, how should we orient ourselves to his work? Fred Alford (2002) claims that “Levinas has become everything to everyone” (p. 1), a sort of philosophical Rorschach card. Determined to end this ambiguity, and drawing upon psychoanalysis, he proceeds to tell us what Levinas really means, how his philosophy is lacking, and how it ought to be improved. But he does make a point that is worth heeding. It is important for us to bring ourselves and something of our background to a reading of Levinas and for that reading to be a dialogue. In this presentation I will attempt to articulate one possible direction for such a dialogue.

### Levinas and Phenomenology

One way to orient oneself to Levinas is to think of him as writing about the “lifeworld,” the world of human experience. Thinking of his work in this way is not much of a stretch, or so it would seem. His first book was a study of Husserl’s theory of intuition (Levinas, 1930/1973) and he was deeply influenced by Husserl and Heidegger. The circle of colleagues with whom he was in conversation, although not necessarily in agreement, included Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Gabriel Marcel. Levinas himself has stated that “from the point of view of philosophical method and discipline, I remain to this day a phenomenologist” (Levinas & Kearney, 1986, p.14).

And yet is his philosophy really about the world in which we live our lives, is it firmly rooted in reflections on human experience? This question keeps cropping up, given, among other things, his claim that our relationship to the other is ethical before it is anything else (Levinas,

1961/1969). In other words, ethics is a given and thus at the core of interpersonal relations, however much we may fail to see, deny, or evade this truth. One reviewer, Martin Jay, has argued that “Levinas’s abiding preoccupation remains less knowledge in the guise of descriptive statements of what is, than injunctions in the form of prescriptive imperatives about what ought to be” (Jay, 2006, p. 85). If this is the case, then Levinas has stepped outside of the phenomenological tradition and our orientation to his work ought to change accordingly. Levinas’s (1974/1981) discussion of the nature of the self as “always persecuted or accused, traumatized and held hostage” (Morgan, 2011, p. 132) in *Otherwise than Being*, further raises questions about whether and to what extent he is a phenomenologist.

Although Jay is not alone in his position, a number of scholars disagree with him. John Drabinsky (2001) has written a whole book dedicated to showing that “Phenomenology is the point of access and term of justification for Levinas’s first philosophy, ethics” (p. 12). The very writing of Drabinsky’s book, of course, suggests that the matter of Levinas’s position is not self-evident. George Kunz (2002) suggests as much when he states that Levinas is a phenomenologist, but one who is “pointing to what is beyond the phenomenon, to what is infinitely beyond our perception” (pp. 129-130). The phrase “beyond the phenomenon” makes one pause. Stephen Strasser (1982) takes a somewhat different tack when he addresses Levinas’s “uncompromising radicalism” (p. 647). By this radicalism Strasser is referring, I think it is fair to say, to things that at first sight make no sense at all, especially in regard to his philosophy as articulated, once more, in *Otherwise than Being* (Levinas, 1974/1981). Strasser (1982) takes the position that Levinas’s philosophy “always refers to *fundamental experiences*” (p. 647). He adds, “if these experiences, which Levinas describes in an impressive manner, did not evoke in us an echo of familiarity, his analyses would make the impression of fantasies—and this they are not” (pp. 647-648).

So here we have the notion of “beyond phenomena” on the one hand and “echo of familiarity” on the other. Perhaps these notions can be reconciled but I believe for many readers it is a tension that is an inescapable part of studying Levinas and thinking about the relationship of his philosophy to one’s practice and life. For the moment, I will mention one way of thinking about this apparent paradox that does not dissolve the tension but makes it more understandable. David Fryer (2004) who situates Levinas within the phenomenological tradition, broadly conceived, argues that his descriptions should be seen as “descriptions of the very structures that underlie our experiences of the world, in particular as descriptions of the structure of subjectivity and intersubjectivity” (p. 7). Insofar as this is an account of what Levinas’s descriptions are about, one can perhaps begin to see how *echo of familiarity* and *beyond phenomenon* may fit together: the very structures of our existence are both intimately familiar to us insofar as we live them and yet also invisible to us as the foundation of our existence. I say “may fit together” because the situation is more nuanced than that and because I believe that living with the tension is constructive, as I will explain later

As I said at the beginning, interpreting Levinas is a formidable challenge for those of us in the social sciences. Invariably, we rely on philosophical interpreters along the way. For me, the first person in that role was Charles Keyes at Duquesne University. More recently, as I have worked on this paper, I have found Michael Morgan’s (2011) new book, *The Cambridge Introduction to Emmanuel Levinas*, most helpful. One of Morgan’s (2011) comments is especially noteworthy:

The suggestiveness of the metaphor of height, like much of Levinas's vocabulary, is meant to perplex and redirect our thinking and our attention; it is not meant to clarify and make precise what begins as vague and unclear but rather to change our perspective altogether (p.146).

There is no doubt that he succeeds in perplexing us. Whether he succeeds in bringing about redirection in his readers is harder to answer and obviously this is a much more difficult task. But Morgan's comment is a reminder that Levinas's language is highly metaphorical and suggests a way of interpreting his use of provocative and allegorical language.

Like a number of other commentators, Morgan understands Levinas as a phenomenologist, but he seems to hedge when he writes, "Levinas's claims about ethics could be appreciated as deep and radical but his insights are not incompatible with our ordinary lives" (Morgan, 2011, vii). Elsewhere, he states more affirmatively that Levinas's basic concepts do refer to aspects of our existence. However, the connection may not be so obvious because though the concepts refer to dimensions that we characteristically overlook and thus Levinas is trying to get us to look at our lives with others with different eyes. Secondly, as David Fryer has indicated, his philosophy refers to the very foundation of our social relations which by its very nature is all but invisible to us.

To read and appreciate Levinas, one also has to take into account his biography because, as Stephen Strasser (1982) has written, his life "is entangled in history itself" (p. 612). He lived in the midst and then the shadow of the holocaust. The Lithuanian side of his family of his family was killed by the Nazis, and he himself was a prisoner of war as a French soldier. To say that after Auschwitz everything was different would be an understatement. The holocaust brought into question or shattered the taken-for-granted assumptions about religion, ethics, and politics of intellectuals as well as ordinary people. Levinas was raised on the Hebrew Bible and this, along with the Talmud, continued to be a source of understanding for him, even as his interpretation of the Jewish tradition changed in view of the unfolding of the catastrophic events in Europe and their aftermath.

Drawing upon the Biblical tradition, he identified the dominance of Greek thought in Western philosophy as a serious problem, as is evident, for example, in his critique of Heidegger. Although Levinas made a distinction between his philosophical and religious writings, he acknowledged that they had "a common source of inspiration" (Levinas & Kearney, 1986, p.18). Of course, other philosophers such as Descartes, Spinoza, Marcel, and Kierkegaard were indebted to the biblical tradition, each in their own way (Polka, 1990). There are two reasons why I mention Levinas's relationship to these two major traditions. First, it may be helpful to keep in mind that while Levinas refers at some length to Greek philosophers, he is primarily working within the Hebrew or biblical tradition. This is evident in the language he uses and the way in which he uses the concept of infinity. Second, the fact that he is directly engaged in the task of working with and addressing the relationship between these two major currents in Western thought partially explains why his analyses of intersubjectivity are difficult to interpret.

#### Bringing the Life-World to a Reading of Levinas

What I have said so far gives some direction for how one might approach Levinas. Yet it also reminds us that addressing his work is a daunting task. It is tempting at this point to say, "Let's leave philosophy to the philosophers." But this won't do, because he speaks to us as persons and

because his work requires and prods us to think through critical issues in human relations and ethics. In any case it is too late; for better or worse psychologists and other social scientists have become engaged with his thought. So once again, I ask how should one “read” Levinas, in the sense of bringing to bear his philosophy on our everyday relationships and our practice as psychologists and psychotherapists? Should one take him as an “authority,” as the Other (to use his own language) who brings into question our assumptions and challenges our freedom? I do not think so. The task is not to become followers of Levinas but to try to see what he is pointing to, just as the task set out by Edmund Husserl was not to endlessly repeat his admonition that we should “return to the things themselves,” but to actually return to the things themselves. Since our existence is relational at its very core, should not our response to and questioning of Levinas come from our reflecting on our already always existing immersion in the territory that he addresses?

Let us then proceed from the evidence of everyday life, the life world, that is, the evidence provided by concrete first-hand accounts of memorable, even if subtle, coming face-to-face with other as Other. This approach takes the life world as the mediator and common thread between ourselves and Levinas. It is in line with van den Berg’s (1972) definition of phenomenology as the science of examples. The following is a brief illustration, drawing upon two stories, of how such a dialogue might proceed.

The first description was written by a young woman as an assignment for an upper level psychology class I taught some years ago (see the Appendix for the complete description). This story falls into a category of interpersonal events that have been of interest to me for some years, and that are also relevant to a study of Levinas (Halling, 2008).

Rebecca has a good friend named Carol who in her eyes exemplifies the ideal of femininity—beautiful, intelligent, well-liked, and kind. She is a model and because she is so attractive, other girls hate to stand near her on the beach.

The incident she describes takes place on a late and hot August morning. Rebecca goes over to Carol’s house, and she at first assumes Carol was still asleep since the air conditioner has not been turned on. But when she knocks on the door, Carol tells her to come in but not in her usual voice. When she enters the bedroom she finds Carol looking very distraught, her eyes red, as if she had been crying, and the room in shambles. She tells Rebecca that she didn’t want anyone but her to know what had happened. Carol shows Rebecca a picture of a man she had been dating for some time, someone she had originally thought was honestly interested in her as a person. Rebecca’s first response is unsympathetic because Carol had dated a number of men but dropped them after one date. Specifically, she tells Carol that her cousin who after one date with her had come home raving about how gorgeous she was would have been happy to have had a second date with her.

In response to this comment, Carol erupts in anger, shouting that this is exactly what she was talking about, and then throws herself on the bed, crying. The worst thing, she says, is that even she, Rebecca, does not know her. This comment gets Rebecca annoyed and defensive and yet she really wants to find out what is going on with her friend.

Once she starts to listen, Carol explains that people stereotype her as just a beautiful girl, as a kind of display, and they don’t see her. When she mentions that she loves to write poetry and sketch, this was ignored. She has become adept at quickly recognizing if her dates were just taken by her appearance, but with this latest man she had been fooled. When she had shared her

innermost thoughts and poetry with him the night before, he had made fun of her in front of the other people they were with. This had hurt her very deeply.

Rebecca, who had no idea that her friend wrote poems, asks if she could see them. Carol agrees and seems encouraged by her interest. Looking through Carol's poems and sketches, Rebecca is both surprised and impressed. Some of her sketches are really funny and insightful. As Carol points out specific things she had written to her, Rebecca realizes that her opinion matters to Carol and this too surprises her.

In her reflections on this experience, Rebecca notes that she, like everyone else, had seen just the exterior of Carol and that she deeply regrets this. The person she came to see through this experience is vulnerable and sensitive, "with a hidden depth, one that I had no idea existed."

It does not take a lot of effort to show connections between Levinas's philosophy and this story. It is the appeal of the other who brings into question the freedom of the self. The other here is not the sick, widow or an orphan but of course Levinas is not using these terms in literal sense; he is referring to the vulnerability of the Other. Levinas (1961/1969) writes of "the resistance of what has no resistance--the ethical resistance" (p. 199). Rebecca is caught up in her idealization as well as her judgment of Carol and it is Carol who in her distress provides the possibility for Rebecca to respond with genuine interest and open herself up to the situation of her friend. Through this incident, Rebecca comes to know Carol in a deeper and more three-dimensional way, and she herself is changed in a positive way. Morgan (2011) aptly writes, "Responsibility is not a burden, it does not deflate itself. It fulfills it, or perhaps more accurately, it makes it possible for the self to fulfill itself by responding to, accepting and serving the other person" (p. 99). And yet there is also the experience of regret and having previously missed seeing Carol as the person she is. At the end of his book on Levinas, George Kunz (1998) writes powerfully about the way in which regret is inescapably part of our lives because we can never fully meet our responsibility to others. Even so we are, at times, nourished by our genuine responsiveness to them.

I will just touch one more issue before moving on to the next story, and it has to do with something that is implicit in a description like this one and one that is central in Levinas's philosophy. Rebecca writes, "In her poems she expressed a hidden depth, one that I had no idea existed." One way of reading this statement is that now she knows that hidden depth, that she knows Carol in a true or at least truer way. No doubt this is part of what she means and part of what is going on here. But I think that it is also fair to say that the description points to the way in which we are witnesses to the transcendence of the other, or the Other as absolutely Other even while we also experience the other as a fellow human being. In most instances, this is something that we do not have words for, and that we allude to rather than describing explicitly. The next description may get closer to addressing this ineffable dimension of our experience of others.

Our second narrator is the Canadian religion writer and theologian Thomas Harpur (1983). He had set out to interview Mother Teresa in Calcutta, India and to learn about the humanitarian work in which she and her co-workers were engaged. Not long after arriving in the city, he went to visit a hostel for the poor and the dying. To his dismay, the nurse accompanying him handed him some food and instructed him to feed a feverish Hindu man lying on a cot. This is not something that Harpur had bargained for; the man looked anything but appealing and there was

also the risk of contracting a fever. His description of what happened next is brief but memorable:

Yet as I knelt to break the bread, put it in his mouth, and pour the broth when his eyes showed that he wanted to drink, a remarkable change took place in me. It was in no way anything to boast of—after all, the nurse really gave me no choice—but I found myself overcoming my revulsion and fear. I caught a glimpse of what Mother Teresa calls ‘the Christ in every man or woman’ and was deeply moved (Harpur, 1983, p.178).

Here also, as in the previous description, is the sense that the narrator is called by the Other, who in this case is both ill and indigent, to responsibility and service. But what is especially striking is how Harpur speaks of the Other as a transcendent being, in explicitly religious language. We do not know precisely what he meant by the “Christ in every man or woman” but to me it resonates with some of Levinas’s language in *Otherwise and Being* (1974/1981). In this text he writes of how there is a trace of the divine in the interhuman. This is Morgan’s (2011) summary of Levinas’s position: “It is as if there are moments in human existence when the divine encounters the human and yet ‘departs’ at the same instant, and in departing, the divine leaves a ‘trace’ of itself” (p. 153).

Having looked briefly at these two descriptions, a number of questions suggest themselves. Are these kinds of experiences relevant to a dialogue with Levinas’s philosophy? Perhaps the first story is too pedestrian and the second too ambiguous. No doubt there are better examples that one could come up with as one engages in a conversation with Levinas. Perhaps examples from one’s own life might be as meaningful or even more meaningful in a dialogue with him. At the same time, are we not required to reflect on the everyday world as we read his texts? Levinas repeatedly stated that he is not writing about some alternative world. In his own words, “The relationship with the Other world is not produced outside of the world, but puts in question the world possessed” (Levinas, 1961/1969, p. 173). Although one can read this statement at a number of levels, it seems clear to me that it is a phenomenological assertion, a statement, so to speak, about the way things are.

What about Levinas’s position of ethics as first philosophy, what one might call his metaphysics? Richard Cohen (2002) has a lovely and succinct way of expressing the essence of this “metaphysics”: “To be originally is to be morally” (Cohen, 2002, p. 43). In my view, Levinas’s position is also an anthropological position, a perspective on the very nature of the human condition. It may well be a position that is deep and radical, as Morgan (2011) claims, but that does not mean that it is beyond evidence, although evidence understood in a very broad way. Is it possible to reflect on concrete phenomenological descriptions as a way of evaluating this position? Perhaps it is, but should we not also look at a wider range of sources, including artistic, anthropological, and historical “data.” We might, for example, look to the Western mystical tradition, which at least in some of its forms is not, as we tend to assume, otherworldly but this worldly. That is, it focuses on experiences that transcend the distinction between spirit and body, secular and religious.

#### Conclusion: How can the truth make us free

To bring this presentation to a conclusion, I return to my earlier statement that in reading Levinas living with tension is constructive. By this, I referred to staying with the apparent reality that his philosophy *is* and *is not* just based on a reflection on the life world. If we simply accept that his

writings address everyday life, then we end up not taking either him or our own experience seriously. Then we are not engaged in a dialogue with him, we are not struggling to find what out he means or what he misses. Nor are we acting as phenomenologists who are exploring and reflecting on events in our lives. In this sense, the title of my paper, “What in the Life World is Levinas Talking About?” is both a question and an answer. That is, we ought to ask this question continually as we read Levinas and not assume an answer at the outset.

Several years ago, I had a conversation with my friend and colleague Judy Dearborn Nill who has studied New Testament Greek. She mentioned the passage in St. John’s Gospel, (8:32) where Jesus tells his disciples that “You shall know the truth and the truth shall set you free” (New English Bible, 1961, p. 166), and suggested that this translation is incomplete or misleading. She referred me to a Greek scholar, Kenneth Wuest (1961) who believes that a more accurate translation is “And you shall know the truth in an experiential way, and the truth shall make you free” (p. 233). That is, the knowing in this passage should be understood not as abstract or theoretical but more intimate or personal.

I think that this emphasis on knowing as experientially based or validated is what phenomenological researchers and psychotherapists bring or can bring to a reading of Emmanuel Levinas; it is an approach that makes his philosophy more meaningful for us and likely for others as well. It is an approach that is appropriate for reading Levinas because, as Strasser (1982) writes, his analyses evoke in us an echo of familiarity.

### **Appendix: Description 1**

Smiling at you from covers of magazines beguiling you to use the products they do our societies symbols promise instant health, beauty and fulfillment. These cover girls are always the perfect envisionment of femininity, their clothes meticulously co-ordinated with the correct make-up and hairstyle. Everyone thinks these people must be out of a fairy tale, after all, something that fantastic couldn’t exist. Let me assure you they do, one’s alive and well and living in Pennsylvania. She happens to be a very close friend of mine, Carol.

Carol has to be the most gorgeous girl anyone could ever dream of. Her hair is dark brown and about shoulder length; the model agency, Ford’s, advised her to wear it tawny color which highlights her sparkly white teeth and ice blue eyes. On the beach Carol is the girl you hate to stand near. I always tried to lay in an opposite direction so our bodies wouldn’t be as easily comparable.

Now when you look at people in a magazine you can always rationalize that anyone that beautiful must have a rotten disposition or otherwise crummy personality right? Wrong, in all the year I’ve known Carol I’ve never know her to be anything but kind and fair to everyone, so that despite her beauty she’s well liked by girls as well as guys. To sum up all I’ve said in one concise statement Carol is beautiful, kind, intelligent and popular. I’ve known her for so long but it seems I just met her this summer.

It was a late August morning at the shore when I walked across the street to Carol’s house. Although it was already quite warm the air-conditioner wasn’t on. I thought Carol was still asleep but I knocked on her door just to be sure. I heard muffled a come in. I walked in the room, the drapes were drawn which was completely un-Carol she always flung them back as

soon as she woke up, she said it helped keep her awake. My eyes adjusted to the gloom and I saw Carol crumpled in the middle of the bed. Black make-up was streaked in lines down her cheeks; her eyes were all red and puffy. She looked as if she'd been crying for some time. There was a photograph album lying next to her. She said she didn't want anyone to know but that she wanted to tell me.

She opened the album to a picture of her and a tall dark and handsome man taken when she was in the Bahamas that past winter. She told me his name was Ed and the primary reason for her distress. He's a player for a famous football team and she said she thought he was a really nice person but evidently she was mistaken. She told me how they met. They had both been at a cocktail party and he had recognized her from one of her photographs. They started to talk and she said he seemed honestly interested in her. She had seen him quite regularly after that. She said she thought there was more to it than usual. I didn't understand that comment, and felt myself getting angry with her. Carol had more guys at her door-step at one time than any normal girl has in a lifetime, but she always tosses them aside. I thought indignantly that it was her fault that she'd never had a meaningful relationship, after all you couldn't expect to know someone after just one date.

I had a personal interest in the matter. I had gotten her a date. I decided to bring this up. I told her my cousin would have been happy to see her again. He had come home raving about her; how gorgeous she was. That comment elicited an explosion she threw a stuffed animal across the room shouting that's exactly what she meant. She had flung herself on the bed again crying. I had never seen Carol in such a display of emotion, she was usually so cool. Carol said the fact that I didn't even know her was the most awful thing. That put me on the defensive, I was annoyed and asked her to explain.

She said the minute people look at her she's stereotyped as just a beautiful girl, nothing more. I told her I didn't see anything so terrible in that. She insisted it was, for instance when you told someone you loved to write poetry and sketch they just seemed to ignore that. Carol went on to say that she was beginning to feel like a display and there wasn't really anything else to her. She found that she could usually tell after the first date but this time she had flopped. She had shared her poetry and innermost thoughts with Ed and at a dinner party the night before he had brought them up jokingly. She said she had felt as if she could just crawl out of the place, she wanted to be as inconspicuous as possible. As she spoke her position verified her words; she was hugging her legs to her body with her chin resting on her knees, her tearful stare was removed. She focused back in on me. I mentioned that I had never seen her poetry. She said she thought I wouldn't have been interested. I told her I was, that seemed to cheer her up a bit.

Carol had several notebooks full of writing, I leafed through them but every now and then one would catch my attention. She had small sketchings next to them, they were quite good as were the poems I read. She described the entire ocean or a small shell or the movement of a gull. She also did some character sketches that were really funny. They had good insight. To be more specific, I had never noticed those things about the people. She told me she wrote them when she was particularly angry with that person.

Her writing both impressed and surprised me, she seemed to sense this. She had a funny smile on her face. She told me she wrote when she felt she just couldn't cope with people. Writing; she said organized her thoughts for her, and put them in a better perspective. She had stopped crying and was looking through the notebooks herself, pointing out different things she had written to me. She seemed to be waiting for my reaction to her work. I noticed her leaning

forward the way someone does when they're anticipating something, when it really matters. That surprised me that my opinion mattered to Carol.

### Analysis

Carol had always been my idol. I was one of her closest friends and had never seen her looking anything but fantastic. I don't think anyone ever did. I never saw her become really angry with anyone, just mildly annoyed and then she'd tell them and that would be that.

That day in the summer when I walked into her house, I immediately noticed a difference. The air-conditioner off. Now that's a big thing for Carol. She usually gets up early turns it on and then goes back to sleep. She didn't that morning. All the drapes were drawn giving a gloomy cast to the house. I didn't know it then but the dimness fit her mood.

As I have mentioned I had never seen Carol looking bad. She takes off her make-up at night goes to bed and when she gets up in the morning looks great. That night she hadn't taken off her make-up, her black streaked face and puffy eyes shocked me. She looked awful, it's important because I never thought she could.

It had never impressed me that Carol cared for anyone or for that matter wanted to. When she talked about Ed I didn't understand her comment concerning a lasting relationship. All I saw was Carol tossing aside guy after guy. I guess I always attributed that her boredom of them. It's hard to say, but I suppose I was a bit jealous of Carol. I never even bothered to look for the meaning behind her actions but just looked at the actions themselves.

Her explosion after my comment was totally unexpected. that was Carol. Or to be more correct that wasn't how I knew Carol. It seems now that all I had known Carol as everyone else had known her. She saw that and was disappointed. When she explained her situation to me I could finally empathize with her. The experience she had with Ed, to her was the total breach of confidence. She had shared her deepest emotions with him and he had flung them back at her. The worst part about it was how he did it, in a joke to other people. When she told me about it I could just feel the hurt emanating from her. I could also see her desire to be seen as a person, I wanted to read her poetry to find more out about the person she was.

In her poems she expressed a hidden depth, one that I had no idea existed. I was hurt by myself, after know her all the year I had and not even bother to know her as a person. I too was guilty of just taking Carol for face value and nothing else. I realized that morning how much she wanted to be seen as herself. I had used her as a being without emotions, I never thought it mattered to her when we left her behind. But I suppose it had.

The whole occurrence of that morning made me realize just who Carol was. A PERSON. She is not a superstar void of emotions but a feeling, sensitive human being. One who values the opinion and companionship of another person but finds it difficult because of preconceived notions about people like herself. I'm glad she confided in me that morning because I'm afraid I would have never seen her for the person she really is. I too would have just continued to look at the exterior without even realizing there was an interior.

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