Dino Falaschetti, Albers Gleed Chair, publishes

Dino Falaschetti, Gleed Chair and visiting professor of finance and business law in the Albers School of Business and Economics, co-authored “Auditor Independence and the Quality of Information in Financial Disclosures: Evidence for Market Discipline vs. Sarbanes-Oxley Proscriptions,” which appeared in American Law and Economics Review (http://ssrn.com/abstract=1468988), and “An Information Market Proposal for Regulating Systemic Risk,” which was published in the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law (http://ssrn.com/abstract=1461003). He also co-authored “Will Dodd-Frank Increase Inflation and Compromise Business Judgments? Theory, Evidence, and Implications for Organizational Planners, Risk Managers, and Proxy Advisors,” which is forthcoming in the Banking and Financial Services Policy Report, and wrote “SEC v. Goldman Sachs: Political-Legal Risks and Economic Strategies for Litigators and Transaction Planners” for Economists Ink: A Brief Analysis of Policy and Litigation.

Read more about the new Gleed Chair.




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